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Plaintiffs Dianne Bentley, Jennifer Grace, Adan Moya, Coresa Trimble, and Robert Wing 
(collectively, “Plaintiffs”), on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, bring this class action 
against Defendants Google LLC, Google Ireland Ltd., Google Commerce Ltd., Google Asia Pacific Pte. 
Ltd., and Google Payment Corp. (collectively, “Google”), and allege the following based upon 
information and belief, except as to those allegations that are based on Plaintiffs’ personal knowledge. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
1. This is an antitrust class action arising out of Google’s unlawful conduct concerning the 
Google Play Store, Google’s store for the distribution and sale of billions of applications (“apps”) and 
in-app purchases running on Android smartphones and other mobile devices utilizing the Android 
operating system. Through its acquisition and maintenance of an unlawful monopoly, and its 
anticompetitive contractual restrictions imposed on app developers, Google has forced consumers to pay 
supra-competitive prices for apps and in-app purchases on the Google Play Store. Although Google has 
publicly acknowledged “that developers should have a choice in how they distribute their apps and that 
stores should compete for the consumer’s and the developer’s business,”1 its unlawful conduct has 
prevented such choices and foreclosed competition, to the enormous detriment of consumers throughout 
the United States.  By this action, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and other consumers, seek monetary 
damages for injuries sustained from Google’s unlawful conduct, and injunctive relief enjoining Google 
from continuing its anticompetitive conduct.  
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
2. This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ federal antitrust claims pursuant 
to the Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337. The Court has 
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 
 
1Sameer Samat, Listening to Developer Feedback to Improve Google Play, ANDROID DEVELOPERS 
BLOG (Sept. 28, 2020), https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2020/09/listening-to-developer-
feedback-to.html. 
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3. This Court also has subject-matter jurisdiction over the state law claims pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1332 based on the diversity of citizenship of the Plaintiffs and of Defendants, and the amount 
in controversy exceeds $75,000. 
4. Alternatively, this Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the state law claims pursuant 
to the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). The amount-in-controversy, exclusive of costs 
and interests, exceeds the sum of $5,000,000, in the aggregate, there are well over 100 members of the 
proposed Class, and a Plaintiff and a Defendant are citizens of different states. Plaintiff Grace is a citizen 
of Pennsylvania and Defendants Google LLC and Google Payment are citizens of California, where they 
maintain their principal places of business. 
5. This Court has personal jurisdiction over the Defendants. Google LLC and Google 
Payment are headquartered in this District. All Defendants have engaged in sufficient minimum contacts 
with the United States and have purposefully availed themselves of the benefits and protections of United 
States and California law, such that the exercise of jurisdiction over them would comport with due 
process requirements.  
6. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because Google LLC and 
Google Payment maintain their principal places of business in the State of California and in this District, 
because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims occurred in this 
District, and because, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3), any Defendants not resident in the United 
States may be sued in any judicial district and their joinder with others shall be disregarded in determining 
proper venue. In the alternative, personal jurisdiction and venue also may be deemed proper under 
Section 12 of the Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22, because Defendants may be found in or transact 
business in this District. 
III. INTRA-DISTRICT ASSIGNMENT 
7. Pursuant to N.D. Cal. Civil Local Rule 3.2 and General Order 44, this antitrust class action 
shall not be assigned to a particular Division of this District but shall be assigned on a District-wide basis.   
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IV. PARTIES 
8. Plaintiff Dianne Bentley is an individual residing in North Carolina who purchased an 
application(s) and/or made an in-app purchase(s) through the Google Play Store during the relevant 
statutory period. 
9. Plaintiff Jennifer Grace is an individual residing in Pennsylvania who purchased an 
application(s) and/or made an in-app purchase(s) through the Google Play Store during the relevant 
statutory period.  
10. Plaintiff Adan Moya is an individual residing in Colorado who purchased an 
application(s) and/or made an in-app purchase(s) through the Google Play Store during the relevant 
statutory period.  
11. Plaintiff Coresa Trimble is an individual residing in Missouri who purchased an 
application(s) and/or made an in-app purchase(s) through the Google Play Store during the relevant 
statutory period.  
12. Plaintiff Robert Wing is an individual residing in Florida who purchased an application(s) 
and/or made an in-app purchase(s) through the Google Play Store during the relevant statutory period.  
13. Defendant Google LLC is a Delaware limited liability company with its principal place 
of business in Mountain View, California. Google LLC is the primary operating subsidiary of the publicly 
traded holding company Alphabet Inc. The sole member of Google LLC is XXVI Holdings, Inc., a 
Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Mountain View, California. Google LLC 
contracts with all app developers that distribute their apps through the Google Play Store and is therefore 
a party to the anticompetitive contractual restrictions at issue in this suit. 
14. Defendant Google Ireland Limited (“Google Ireland”) is a limited company organized 
under the laws of Ireland with its principal place of business in Dublin, Ireland, and is a subsidiary of 
Google LLC. Google Ireland contracts with all app developers that distribute their apps through the 
Google Play Store and is therefore a party to the anticompetitive contractual restrictions at issue in this 
suit. 
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15.  Defendant Google Commerce Limited (“Google Commerce”) is a limited company 
organized under the laws of Ireland with its principal place of business in Dublin, Ireland, and is a 
subsidiary of Google LLC. Google Commerce contracts with all app developers that distribute their apps 
through the Google Play Store and is therefore a party to the anticompetitive contractual restrictions at 
issue in this suit. 
16. Defendant Google Asia Pacific Pte. Limited (“Google Asia Pacific”) is a private limited 
company organized under the laws of Singapore with its principal place of business in Mapletree 
Business City, Singapore, and is a subsidiary of Google LLC. Google Asia Pacific contracts with all app 
developers that distribute their apps through the Google Play Store and is therefore a party to the 
anticompetitive contractual restrictions at issue in this suit. 
17. Defendant Google Payment Corp. (“Google Payment”) is a Delaware corporation with its 
principal place of business in Mountain View, California, and is a subsidiary of Google LLC. Google 
Payment provides in-app payment processing services to Android app developers and Android users and 
collects a 30% commission on many types of processed payments, including payments for apps sold 
through the Google Play Store and in-app purchases made within such apps. 
V. RELEVANT FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
A. Google’s Domination Of The Market For Licensable Smart Mobile Operating 
Systems 
18. Google’s monopolization of the markets at issue in this case, the Android App Store 
Market and the Android In-App Payment Processing Market, as described in Sections V(B) and (C), are 
better understood through a discussion of smart mobile devices and Google’s domination and control of 
the Android operating system of the related market for licensable smart mobile operating systems 
(“OSs”). 
19. Smart mobile devices, including smartphones and tablets, are handheld, portable 
electronic devices that enable the user to connect wirelessly to the Internet and perform multi-purpose 
computing functions, including, but not limited to, internet browsing, shopping, accessing social media, 
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streaming videos and music, and playing games. Many consumers now rely solely on their smart mobile 
device and have no other personal computer system.  
20. Mobile devices require an operating system (“OS”) to provide basic multi-purpose 
computing functionality, including the installation and operation of compatible mobile apps; button, 
touch, and motion commands; and a graphical user interface consisting of icons. A mobile operating 
system (“mobile OS”) is an OS that is built exclusively for a mobile device, such as a smart phone or 
tablet.  
21.  Companies that design and sell smart mobile devices are referred to as original equipment 
manufacturers (“OEMs”). Android is the only commercially viable OS that is widely available to license; 
thus, OEMs have a single mobile OS option: Google’s Android OS. Accordingly, Google has monopoly 
power over the market for mobile OSs that are available for license by OEMs. 
22. Prior to sale, an OEM must pre-install an OS on each mobile device in order to provide 
purchasers with access to basic functions, including those described above. OEMs design mobile devices 
to ensure compatibility with whatever OS is selected for that device. Implementation of a mobile OS 
requires significant time and investment from OEMs, and switching to another mobile OS, as discussed 
in Section V(B)(2), is disruptive, expensive, and time-consuming. 
23. The vast majority of OEMs do not develop their own OS, so they must choose and license 
an OS for their devices. There is therefore a relevant market for licensable smart mobile OSs consisting 
of mobile OSs that OEMs can license for their smart mobile devices. The market does not include: (1) 
proprietary OSs that are unavailable for licensing, such as Apple’s mobile OS, called iOS which is used 
on Apple’s iPhone and iPad products; (2) mobile devices that lack the multi-computing functions of smart 
mobile devices and tablets (e.g., “flip phones”); or (3) electronic devices whose OS are not compatible 
with mobile device OS (e.g., desktop computers or gaming systems like Xbox). Historically, the market 
for smart mobile OSs included the Android OS, developed by Google, the Tizen mobile OS, a partially 
open-source mobile OS that was developed by the Linux Foundation and Samsung, and the Windows 
Phone OS developed by Microsoft. 
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24. The geographic scope of the market for licensable smart mobile OSs is worldwide, 
excluding China. Google’s operations in China are limited for legal and regulatory reasons, Google does 
not make available many of its products for mobile devices sold within China, and non-Google, Android 
devices are widely available and popular there. Lastly, while Google contractually requires OEMs 
licensing Android not to sell devices with competing Android-compatible mobile OSs outside of China, 
it does not impose such restrictions on devices sold within China. Outside of China, OEMs must all 
contractually consent that if their device licenses the Android OS, they will not sell devices preloaded 
with a competing, Android-compatible mobile OS. 
25. The geographic scope of the market for licensable smart mobile operating systems 
includes a separate sub-market within the United States which operates as described throughout this 
Complaint. 
26. Google possesses monopoly power in the market for licensable smart mobile OSs through 
its Android OS.  
27. A mobile ecosystem of products like apps, devices, and accessories typically develops 
around one or more mobile OSs, such as the Android OS. The “Android ecosystem” is a system of mobile 
products that are inter-dependent and compatible with each other and the Android OS. Ecosystem 
participants include Google, OEMs of Android-compatible devices, developers of Android-compatible 
apps, Android app distribution platforms, the makers of ancillary hardware such as headphones or 
speakers, cellular carriers, and others.2 The Android ecosystem is akin to the iOS ecosystem created by 
Apple, “[w]hen you combine all of Google’s services with Google’s hardware and its frequently updated 
software, recreating the same type of ecosystem that Apple claims is only possible with Apple, is, indeed, 
possible outside of Apple . . . . Google’s ecosystem is a capable one.”3 
 
2 Jason Cipriani, Is there an alternative to Apple’s ecosystem? Yes, but you’ll have to Google it, ZD 
NET (May 1, 2019), https://www.zdnet.com/article/alternatives-to-apples-ecosystem-yes-there-is-a-
way-out/. 
3 Id. 
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28. As more developers design useful, compatible apps for a specific mobile OS, the more 
consumers will want to use that OS. The more consumers using an OS, the more developers want to 
develop apps for it. Thus, significant barriers to entry arise for new entrants to the OS market. A new OS 
appeals to consumers only if there is a broad array of software applications running on it, and software 
developers are not incentivized to create applications for an OS unless there is a large existing user base. 
29. In order to attract app developers and users, Google misleadingly represents that Android 
is an “open” ecosystem where any participant may create Android-compatible products without 
unnecessary restrictions. Instead, however, Google uses its Android OS to keep its ecosystem closed to 
any competition. As the dominant OS licensor, Google recognizes that participation on its platform is a 
“must-have” market for developers. Google only unlocks the door to its ecosystem for participants 
willing to play by Google’s rules. 
30. Moreover, Google uses the Android OS to restrict which apps and app stores OEMs pre-
install on their devices and to deter the direct distribution of competing app stores and apps to Android 
users, all at the expense of competition in the Android ecosystem. 
31. As a result of Google’s monopoly power in the market for licensable smart mobile OSs, 
OEMs, developers and users cannot choose another mobile OS. OEMs such as ZTE and Nokia 
acknowledge that other, non-proprietary OSs are inadequate substitutes for and not a reasonable 
alternative to licensing the Android OS.4 Other mobile OSs do not currently support many popular mobile 
apps that are valued by consumers. Google, therefore, has constructed a market that biases consumers 
against mobile device purchases from non-proprietary mobile OS other than Android OS. OEMs are 
forced to concede to Google’s demands because it is essential that they offer a popular mobile OS and 
corresponding ecosystem to consumers.  
 
4 Google Android, No. AT.40099, European Commission Decision (July 18, 2018) (“EC Google 
Android Decision”) at ¶ 292, 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/40099/40099_9993_3.pdf. 
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B. Google Unlawfully Maintains A Monopoly In The Android App Store Market 
32. A pre-installed app store is a necessity for mobile device users. An app store is an online 
portal through which software programs are made available for procurement and download. Mobile apps 
make mobile devices valuable to users because they add user-specific functionality for activities such as 
banking, shopping, making travel arrangements, streaming music and videos, reading news sources and 
books, and game playing.  
33. While some apps are pre-installed by OEMs, due to each consumer’s specific preferences, 
OEMs cannot anticipate the various apps a specific consumer may utilize. Furthermore, apps developed 
after a user purchases his or her mobile device cannot, as a practical matter, be pre-installed. Thus, mobile 
devices must provide a way for users to download and/or buy apps post-purchase.  
1. Android App Stores Constitute a Relevant Product Market 
34. The market for Android App Stores constitutes a relevant product market. On Android 
mobile devices, Google maintains its heavily dominant Google Play Store, a pre-loaded digital portal set 
up by Google. On the Google Play Store, mobile apps can be reviewed, purchased (if necessary), and 
downloaded by a consumer.  
35. The European Commission has determined there is a “relevant product market” for 
Android app stores. Google did not contest that determination.5 
36. Google has offered an app store for Google Android since 2008. An early version of 
Google’s app store was known as “Android Market”, which in March 2012, was integrated into Google 
Play and became the Google Play Store. 
37. The Play Store is part of Google Mobile Services, the bundle of Google apps and services 
Google licenses together. 
 
5 EC Google Android Decision at ¶¶ 217(2), 273. “From a supply-side perspective, the development of 
an app store requires significant time and resources, regardless of whether the developer in question has 
already developed other apps. In particular, developers of other apps have stated that the time and 
resources to develop an app store are significant. Microsoft, for example, stated: ‘Using [R&D data] for 
fiscal years 2007 to 2014, we roughly estimate that we spent [millions of dollars] over this time period 
to develop appstores for Windows Phone 7, 8, and 8.1.’” Id. at ¶ 272 (emphasis omitted). 
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38. Unlike other Google apps, the Play Store is not downloadable and therefore needs to be 
pre-installed by OEMs so that users have access to it. App developers cannot distribute alternative apps 
via the Play Store. 
39. In order to download an app (which is either free or available for purchase), an Android 
user must download that application through the Google Play Store. As described by Google, “With some 
apps, you can buy additional content or services within the app. We call these ‘in-app purchases.’ …. 
[S]ome examples of in-app purchases [include]:  
• A sword that gives you more power in a game.  
• A key that unlocks more features of a free app.  
• Virtual currency that can be used for purchases.”6 
40. The Android App Store Market also includes other app stores for Android devices, such 
as Samsung’s Galaxy Apps store and the Amazon AppStore, and independent app stores, such as GetJar. 
41. The Android App Store Market does not include app stores for non-Android smart mobile 
OSs, such as the (now defunct) Windows Mobile Store (which is compatible only with Microsoft’s 
Windows Mobile OS) or Apple’s App Store (compatible only with iOS), because app stores are OS-
specific. A consumer who owns an Android smartphone cannot use an app store developed for a non-
Android OS, and an OEM that pre-installs an app store on an Android device cannot install an app store 
that runs on a non-Android OS. The Google Play Store does not offer apps for download onto Apple 
devices, and the Apple Store does not offer apps for download onto Android devices. 
 
6Google Play Help, Make in-app purchases in Android apps, GOOGLE, 
https://support.google.com/googleplay/answer/1061913?hl=en (last visited Oct. 2, 2020). Examples of 
“products supported by Google Play In-app billing include: Virtual game products . . . . App 
functionality or content . . . . subscription services . . . . [and] Cloud software products.” Examples of 
“products not currently supported by Google Play In-app billing [include]: [r]etail merchandise . . . . 
Service fees . . . . One-time membership fees or recurring dues . . . . One-time payments, including 
peer-to-peer payments . . . . [and] Electronic bill payment . . . .” Classic Play Console Help, Payments, 
GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/9858738?hl=en. (last 
visited Oct. 6, 2020). 
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42. The relevant geographic market for the Android App Store Market is worldwide, 
excluding China.7 China is excluded from the relevant market because legal and regulatory barriers 
prevent the operation of many global app stores, including the Google Play Store, within China. 
Additionally, app stores prevalent in China are not available, or have little presence, outside of China. 
Outside of China, app distribution channels like app stores, are globally developed and distributed, and 
OEMs, in turn, make app stores like the Google Play Store globally available on Android devices. 
43. The geographic scope of the Android App Store Market includes a separate sub-market 
within the United States which operates as described throughout this Complaint. 
2.  Google Monopolizes the Android App Stores Market 
44. Through various anticompetitive acts and unlawful restraints on competition, Google 
possesses and maintains monopoly power in the Android App Stores Market, causing ongoing harm to 
competition and injury to consumers. Google’s monopoly power is evidenced by its market share, the 
absence of countervailing buyer power, and the existence of high barriers to entry and expansion. Apple’s 
App Store (which is not part of the relevant product market), does not exercise an indirect restraint 
sufficient to undermine Google’s monopoly power.  
45. In the Google Android case, the European Commission concluded that Google holds a 
dominant position in the worldwide market (excluding China) for Android App Stores since 2011.8  
46. The existence of iPhone mobile devices applications and in-app products and services are 
not reasonably interchangeable substitutes for Android apps.  
47. In a July 18, 2018 decision, the European Commission concluded that Google abused its 
dominant power in the Android App Store Market. The European Commission fined Google €4.34 billion 
for breaching EU antitrust rules, concluding that, since 2011, Google has imposed illegal restrictions on 
Android device manufacturers and mobile network operators to cement its dominant position in general 
 
7 See EC Google Android Decision at ¶ 402: “The Commission concludes that the [Android App Stores 
Market] for the purpose of these proceedings are: . . . the worldwide market (excluding China) for 
Android app stores”. 
8 Id. at ¶ 439(2).  
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internet searches. The European Commission determined that, “Google is dominant in the worldwide 
market (excluding China) for app stores for the Android mobile operating system. Google’s app store, 
the Play Store, accounts for more than 90% of apps downloaded on Android devices. This market is also 
characterized by high barriers to entry . . . . Google’s app store dominance is not constrained by Apple's 
App Store, which is only available on iOS devices.”9  
48. As determined by the  Majority Staff of the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial and 
Administrative Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary: “Apps are not interoperable between 
operating systems – native apps developed for [Apple’s] iOS only work on iOS devices, and native apps 
developed for Android only work on Android devices.  The [Apple] App Store and the Play Store do not 
compete against one another. Android users cannot access the Apple App Store and iOS users cannot 
access the Google Play Store, so the dominance of the Play Store is not constrained by the App Store and 
vice versa.” ”10  Additionally, “app developers and industry observers agree that Apple and Google 
control the app distribution market on mobile devices.”11 
49. In the United States, iOS and Android represent approximately 99% of the market share 
for mobile OS as of September 2020.12 Because iOS is not licensable, it is not part of the market that is 
in consideration with respect to this case, which is the market for licensable OS for mobile devices. With 
respect to the OS which are licensable, including Samsung and Windows, neither of them has been able 
to penetrate the market share held by Google’s Android OS.13  
 
9 Press Release, Antitrust: Commission fines Google €4.34 billion for illegal practices regarding 
Android mobile devices to strengthen dominance of Google’s search engine, EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
(July 18, 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_4581. 
10 Investigation of Competition in Digital Markets, Majority Staff Report and Recommendations, 
Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial and Administrative Law of the House Committee on the 
Judiciary, at 95 (Oct. 6, 2020), available at 
https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/competition_in_digital_markets.pdf. 
11 Id. at 96. 
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50. Currently, Google’s dominance of the Android App Stores market exceeds 90%. The 
European Commission found that the Google Play Store is pre-installed on 90% of Android devices sold 
outside of China.14 Additionally, the number of apps downloadable from the various app stores shows 
the disparity caused by Google’s monopolistic grip: in 2019, Google Play had 2.7 million available apps 
for download, whereas the next four closest competitors number of apps do not even add up to the total 
the amount of available apps on Google Play (GetJar has 850,000 apps, Aptoide has 1,000,000 apps, 
Amazon AppStore has 480,000 apps, and Opera Mobile Store has 300,000 apps).15  
51. Google’s Play Store’s dominance is also shown by, among other things, the number of 
apps downloaded from the Store, and the enormous number of apps available on the Store. The European 
Commission determined that more than 90% of app store downloads were processed through the Google 
Play Store.16  
52. As further evidence of its monopoly power, Google imposes a supra-competitive 
commission of 30% on the price of apps, and in-app products or services, purchased through the Google 
Play Store: “For apps and in-app products offered through Google Play, the service fee is equivalent to 
30% of the price.”17 This is a far higher fee than would exist absent Google’s misconduct as described 
herein. 
53. Google bundles the Google Play Store with Google Play Services, further reinforcing its 
monopoly. Google Play Services is a proprietary software layer that runs in the background on Android; 
 
14 EC Google Android Decision at ¶ 1451. The Commission concluded that even if the Windows 
Mobile Store share was included in the market, the Google Play Store would still possess a market 
share greater than 90%. Id. 
15 About Us, APTOIDE, https://en.aptoide.com/company/about-us. (last visited Oct. 5, 2020); Artyom 
Dogtiev, App Stores List (2019), BUSINESSOFAPPS, https://www.businessofapps.com/guide/app-stores-
list/. 
16 EC Google Android Decision at ¶ 1451.  
17 Play Console Help, Service fees, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-
developer/answer/112622?hl=en#:~:text=As%20of%20January%201%2C%202018,that%20time%20w
ill%20be%20counted. (last visited Oct. 2. 2020). As of January 1, 2018, under certain circumstances, 
“the service fee for subscription products decreases to 15% for any subscribers you [app developers] 
retain after 12 paid months.” Id.  
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Google Play provides application programming interfaces (APIs) that enable apps to integrate with other 
apps and with Google services.18 These Google services are necessary to the functionality of many apps. 
For example, the majority of apps in the Play Store use Google’s cloud messaging service; and more than 
a million use AdMob, Google’s mobile advertising service.19 Apps cannot access these functionalities 
without Google Play Services. As the European Commission concluded, without Google Play Services, 
“many apps would either crash, or lack important functions.”20 Google does not license the Play Store 
and Google Play Services separately; they can only be licensed together,21 thus further solidifying the 
Play Store as the number one pre-installed app store.  
54. Substantial switching costs ensure that Google’s monopoly power is not constrained by 
any competition in the smart mobile device arena. For example, consumers who own an Android device 
cannot purchase apps from Apple’s App Store without moving to an Apple iOS device (e,g., the iPhone) 
because Apple does not license its OS, nor has it developed or licensed an app store for Android. Thus, 
any consumers who switch from a Google Android device to an Apple device would lose the financial 
investment made in previously-purchased apps. 
55. Additionally, once a consumer selects a smartphone, the consumer cannot replace the pre-
installed mobile OS with an alternative OS -- if a consumer wants to switch OSs, that consumer has no 
choice but to purchase a new mobile device. Moreover, mobile OSs have different designs, controls, and 
functions that consumers learn to navigate and are familiar with over time. The learning curve to navigate 
a different mobile OS is part of consumers’ switching costs. 
 
18 Google Play Developer API, GOOGLE DEVELOPERS, https://developers.google.com/android-
publisher. (last visited Oct. 4, 2020). 
19 EC Google Android Decision at ¶ 142; Google Play, Get paid to show relevant ads from over a 
million advertisers with Google AdMob, GOOGLE DEVELOPERS,  
https://developer.android.com/distribute/best-practices/earn/show-ads-admob. (last visited Oct. 4, 
2020). 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at ¶ 144. 


































CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT 
 
56. Android OEMs find it commercially unreasonable to make and sell phones without the 
Google Play Store, and they view other app stores as poor substitutes because they offer fewer and less 
impressive apps.22 
57. Switching from Android devices may result in a significant loss of personal and financial 
investment that consumers put into the Android ecosystem. Because apps, in-app content and many other 
products are designed for or are only compatible with a particular mobile OS, switching to a new mobile 
OS may mean losing access to such products or to data, even if such apps and  products are available  
within the new ecosystem.  
58. When purchasing a mobile device, consumers have no reason to inquire about Google’s 
anticompetitive contractual restraints and policies. Mobile device purchasers are focused on design, 
brand, processing power, battery life, and cellular plan. These features play a decisive role in a 
consumer’s decision as to which smart mobile device to purchase. 
59. Consumers are also unable to determine the “lifecycle price” of devices -- i.e., to 
accurately assess at the point of purchase how much they will ultimately spend (including on the device 
and all apps and in-app purchases) for the duration of their device ownership. Consumers do not and 
cannot predict all of the apps or in-app content they may eventually purchase. Because they cannot know 
or predict all such factors when purchasing mobile devices, consumers are unable to accurately predict 
the lifecycle prices of the devices. This prevents consumers from effectively taking Google’s 
anticompetitive conduct into account when making mobile device purchasing decisions. 
60.  Consumers who purchase Android devices are thus “locked-in” to the Android OS and 
Android app stores. 
 
22 Federico Etro & Cristina Caffarra, On the economics of the Android case, EUROPEAN COMPETITION 
JOURNAL Vol. 13, Nos. 2-3, 282-313 at 286-87 (Sept. 28, 2017), 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17441056.2017.1386957?needAccess=true (last visited 
Oct. 8, 2020). 
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3.   Google’s Anticompetitive Conduct in the Android App Store Market 
61. Google has willfully and unlawfully maintained its monopoly in the Android App Store 
Market through a series of related anticompetitive acts. 
a. Google’s Contracts with OEMs 
62. Google imposes anticompetitive restrictions in the Android App Store Market on OEMs 
by (1) crippling other app stores by requiring OEMs to give preferential location to the Play Store and 
other Google apps on the device’s home screen; and (2) requiring OEMs to accept a bundle of apps and 
services that include the Google Play Store. 
63. Google conditions OEM licensing of the Google Play Store, as well as other essential 
Google services and the Android trademark, on an OEM’s agreement to provide the Google Play Store 
with preferential treatment compared to any other competing app store. 
64. Android OEMs (which comprise virtually all OEMs) must sign a Mobile Application 
Distribution Agreement (“MADA”) with Google.23 A MADA confers a license to a product bundle 
comprised of proprietary Google apps, Google-supplied services necessary for mobile app functionality, 
and the Android trademark.24 The MADA requires OEMs to locate the Google Play Store on the home 
screen of each mobile device.25 Android OEMs must further pre-install up to 30 Google mandatory apps 
and locate these apps on the home screen or on the next screen, occupying valuable space on each user’s 
mobile device that otherwise could be used for competing app stores and other services.26 These 
requirements ensure that the Google Play Store is the most prominent app store viewed by users; 
accordingly, other app stores are at a significant disadvantage. 
65. As discussed, Google will not license Google Play Services separately from the Play 
Store. The majority of the apps on the Play Store do not function at all or cannot perform all of their 
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66. Through Google’s anticompetitive restrictions in its contracts with OEMs, it is able to 
obstruct OEMs from pre-installing competing app stores on Google’s Android mobile devices. Google 
also insulates itself from competition by issuing misleading warnings to Android users about the efficacy 
of other app stores, as well as time-consuming, multi-step processes (discussed below) to those that do 
choose to download, in an effort to dissuade consumers from downloading said stores. By wrongfully 
and unjustifiably convincing OEMs not to pre-download competing app stores, and intimidating 
consumers that competitors’ stores are unsafe to be download, Google has foreclosed the mechanisms by 
which it would face competition. And, because of the absence of competition, consumers pay supra-
competitive prices for apps and in-app purchases. 
67. Google interferes with OEMs’ ability to distribute Android app stores and apps directly 
to consumers outside the Google Play Store. Even in circumstances when an OEM offers mobile devices 
with easy access to additional mobile app stores and apps through, for example, pre-installed and/or 
prominently placed icons, Google imposes unjustified and pretextual warnings about the security of 
installing the app in order to discourage its download from alternative sources other than the Google Play 
Store, even though the consumer is choosing to install the app fully aware of its source. This conduct 
dissuades users from downloading apps outside of the Google Play Store. 
b. Google’s Contracts with App Developers 
68. Google also imposes anticompetitive restrictions on competing app developers to further 
solidify its monopoly in the Android App Store Market. 
69. First, in order to maintain its monopoly in the App Store Market, Google prohibits any 
app developer that wants to distribute its apps through the Google Play Store from also distributing any 
competing app store through the Play Store.  
70. Google enforces this restraint through Google Play’s Developer Distribution Agreement 
(“DDA”), which Google requires all app developers to sign before they are permitted to distribute their 
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apps via the Google Play Store.27 All of the Defendants, other than Google Payment, are a party to the 
DDA.28 
71. Section 4.5 of the DDA provides that developers “may not use Google Play to distribute 
or make available any Product that has a purpose that facilitates the distribution of software applications 
and games for use on Android devices outside of Google Play.”29 The DDA further reserves to Google 
the right to remove and disable any Android app that it determines violates this requirement.30 The DDA 
is non-negotiable, so developers seeking access to Android users through the Google Play Store must 
accept Google’s standardized contract of adhesion. 
72. In the absence of these unlawful restraints, competing app distributors could allow users 
to replace or supplement the Google Play Store on their devices with competing app stores, easily 
downloaded and installed through the Google Play Store. App stores could compete and benefit 
consumers by offering lower prices and innovative app store models, such as app stores that cater to 
specific consumers’ interests. Without Google’s unlawful restraints, these app stores would provide 
additional platforms on which more apps could be featured, and thereby, discovered by consumers. 
73. Google also restricts competition in the Android App Store Market by closing off critical 
advertising opportunities to app developers who do not list their Android apps in the Google Play Store. 
Google markets an App Campaigns program that, allows app developers to “get your app into the hands 
of more paying users” by “streamlin[ing] the process for you, making it easy to promote your apps across  
Google’s largest properties.”31 This program includes ad placements on Google Search, YouTube, 
Discover on Google Search, and the Google Display Network, and with Google’s “search partners,” that 
 
27 See Google Play, Google Play Developer Distribution Agreement, GOOGLE, 
https://play.google.com/about/developer-distribution-agreement/archive.html. (last accessed Oct. 8, 
2020). 
28 Id.  
29 Id.  
30 Id.  
31 Google Ads Help, About App campaigns, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/google-
ads/answer/6247380?hl=en. (last accessed Oct. 4, 2020). 
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are specially optimized for the advertising of mobile apps.32 But to access the App Campaigns program, 
Google requires that app developers list their app in either the Google Play Store to reach Android users, 
or in the Apple App Store to reach Apple iOS users. This conduct further solidifies Google’s monopoly 
in Android App Distribution by forcing Android app developers to list their apps in the Google Play Store 
or risk losing access to many Android users they could otherwise reach through advertising, including 
through Google’s monopoly search engine, but for Google’s restrictions. 
c. Google’s Restraints on Consumers 
74. Google directly and anticompetitively restricts how consumers discover, download and 
install mobile apps and app stores. Although Google claims to permit consumers to directly download 
and install Android apps and app stores, Google uses its monopoly power to impose a series of 
technological obstacles designed to prevent users from direct downloads. Google misleadingly claims 
users face dangers of these direct downloads, referred to by Google as “sideloading.” 
75. A consumer who wants to download an app or an app store onto her Google Android 
phone or tablet without using the Play Store faces extreme and unwarranted obstacles. Google makes this 
process technically complex, and confusing. In the European Commission’s Google Android case, 
Amazon described the process as follows: “[E]ven for consumers who discover and download an 
alternate store outside of the Play Store, Google has configured Android to block the installation of that 
store. Consumers are unable to install downloadable app stores unless the consumer first navigates to and 
changes Android’s obscure ‘Unknown Sources’ setting to allow installation of apps from sources other 
than the Play Store. When consumers attempt to change this setting, Google displays a message warning 
that ‘your [tablet or phone] and personal data are more vulnerable to attack by apps from unknown 
sources. You agree that you are solely responsible for any damage to your tablet or loss of data that may 
result from using these apps.’”33 
 
32 Id. 
33 EC Google Android Decision at ¶ 635 citing to n.677 in Decision: “See Amazon’s non-confidential 
response to Question 15 of the request for information of 21 October 2015 on app stores (Doc ID 
4067).” 
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76. According to the Majority Staff of the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial and 
Administrative Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary: “Google has created significant friction 
for sideloading apps to Android devices. One developer explained to Subcommittee staff that sideloading 
entails a complicated twenty-step process, and users encounter multiple security warnings designed to 
discourage sideloading. Additionally, software developers that have left the Play Store to distribute 
software to Android users via sideloading have experienced precipitous declines in downloads and 
revenue and report problems updating their apps. Thus, the option for sideloading apps on mobile devices 
does not discipline the market power of dominant app stores.”34   
77. Even if a user proceeds past Google’s unjustified threats and warnings, direct 
downloading is inferior to downloading an app from the Play Store because Google prevents downloaded 
apps from updating in the background -- a benefit reserved solely for apps downloaded via the Google 
Play Store. Instead, users must manually approve every update of a sideloaded app or app store, which 
further discourages consumers from using alternatives to the Play Store. 
78. Google also unjustifiably discourages users from downloading apps and app stores from 
other sources by preventing installation of or even removing apps that it claims are “harmful.”35  
79. Google has the capacity to make it nearly impossible to be able to directly download (or 
“sideload”)36 applications; in an interview, one app developer informed the United States Congress 
“sideloading entails a complicated twenty-step process, and users encounter multiple security warnings 
designed to discourage sideloading.”37 Downloading apps directly – bypassing the Google Play Store – 
 
34 Investigation of Competition in Digital Markets, supra n.10 at 98 (footnotes omitted). See id. (“There 
are no competitive constraints on the power Apple and Google have over the software distribution 
marketplace on their mobile ecosystems.”). 
35 Google Play Help, Help Center, Help protect against harmful apps with Google Play Protect, 
GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/googleplay/answer/2812853?hl=en (last accessed Oct. 8, 2020); 
See also Unwanted Software Policy, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/about/unwanted-software-
policy.html (last accessed Oct. 8, 2020). 
36 With respect to mobile applications, “sideloading” is the process of “downloading apps manually 
from the internet (through a browser [window]” from a source other than an official application store 
(i.e., not from Apple’s App Store or Google’s Play Store). EC Google Android Decision at ¶ 634 citing 
to n.675 in Decision.  
37 Investigation of Competition in Digital Markets, supra n.10 at 98 (footnotes omitted). 
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is prevented on Android devices that are part of Google’s Advanced Protection Program (“APP”).38 
Consumers who enroll in APP cannot directly download apps; their Android device can only download 
apps distributed in the Google Play Store or in another pre-installed app store that Google pre-approved 
an OEM to offer on its devices.39  
80. According to the Majority Staff of the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial and 
Administrative Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary, other app stores and the sideloading of 
apps “do not provide meaningful alternatives to the Google Play Store,” and “[t]he dual dominance of 
the Play Store and the Android ecosystem enable Google to exert control and engage in conduct that 
harms competition by exploiting, excluding, and discriminating against rivals.”40 
81. Thus, app developers cannot reach APP users unless they agree to distribute their apps 
through the Google Play Store or through a separate Google-approved, OEM-offered app store. Google’s 
security pretext is an excuse to further restrict an app developer’s ability to reach Android users, in 
contrast to personal computers, where users can securely purchase and download new software without 
being limited to a single source owned by the PC’s manufacturer.  
82. Additionally, apps downloaded or “sideloaded” from competing app stores, or apps 
directly downloaded from a developer’s website, may not be automatically uploaded in the background. 
Thus, direct downloading is not a viable way for competing app stores to reach Android users, any more 
than it is a viable alternative for single apps. The only difference is that app stores do not have any 
alternative, ensuring that Android users have no choice but to use Google Play Store. Google’s barriers 
erected against competing app distributors also are not the least restrictive means necessary to achieve 
any legitimate security objectives. 
83.  But for Google’s anticompetitive acts, as on a personal computer, Android users could 
download apps from developers’ websites, rather than through an app store. There is no justification that 
 
38 Google Advanced Protection Program, GOOGLE, https://landing.google.com/advancedprotection/. 
(last accessed Oct. 4, 2020). 
39 Id. 
40 Investigation of Competition in Digital Markets, supra n.10 at 221. 
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downloading and installing an app on a mobile device is different. Millions of personal computer users 
safely download and install software directly, such as through Google’s own Chrome browser or Mozilla 
Firefox. 
84. But for Google’s restrictions on direct downloading, app distributors and developers 
would directly distribute their stores and apps to consumers. As explained above, Google makes direct 
downloading substantially and unnecessarily difficult, and in some cases prevents it entirely, further 
restricting any distribution channel. 
85. There is no legitimate justification for Google’s conduct challenged herein, and even if 
there were, Google has not adopted the least restrictive means for achieving it. For decades, PC users 
have installed software acquired from various sources without being deterred by anything like the 
obstacles set up by Google. A PC user can access an internet webpage, download and install an 
application, and be up and running, often in a matter of minutes. Security screening is conducted by 
security software operating in the background, allowing users to download software from any source they 
choose, unlike Android. 
86. Through these anticompetitive acts, including contractual provisions and exclusionary 
obstacles, Google has willfully obtained a virtual monopoly over Android mobile app distribution and in 
the Android App Store Market. Google Play Store downloads have accounted for more than 90% of 
downloads through Android app stores, dwarfing other available distribution channels. 
d. Anticompetitive Effects in the Android App Store Market 
87. Google’s anticompetitive conduct forecloses competition in the Android App Store 
Market, affecting interstate commerce with respect to this Market, causing anticompetitive harm and 
antitrust injury to consumers. 
88. Google’s anticompetitive conduct forces OEMs to commit valuable home screen space to 
the Google Play Store (and other required Google applications), with no regard for the OEM’s 
preferences, including having other app stores/developers’ icons on the home page. These requirements 
limit OEMs’ ability to compete with each other on price and quality of distribution platforms for mobile 
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apps. Google’s restrictions additionally interfere with OEMs’ ability to compete with each other in being 
able to offer consumers Android devices with customized pre-installed apps curated to specific categories 
of mobile device consumers. 
89. Google’s anticompetitive conduct harms consumers by, among other things, impeding 
competition among app distributors, who would otherwise innovate new models of app distribution and 
provide consumers choices that extend beyond Google’s app store. 
90. Consumers are harmed, damaged and injured by Google’s supra-competitive charges of 
30% on the purchase price of apps and in-app purchases sold through the Google Play Store, which is a 
much higher transaction fee than would exist in a competitive market unimpaired by Google’s 
anticompetitive conduct. Google’s supra-competitive prices reduce the output of mobile apps and related 
content by reducing app developers’ incentives and capital to develop new apps and content. 
91.  As explained by the Majority Staff of the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial and 
Administrative Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary:  “Developers have . . .said that the 30% 
commissions charged by app stores have led them to increase prices for consumers and diminished 
innovation by software developers.”41 
92. Google’s restraint of the Android App Store Market hinders the ability and incentive for 
competing app stores, limiting consumers’ ability to discover new apps of interest to them. If there were 
more competing app stores, this would permit additional platforms to feature more and more diverse 
collections of apps. Instead, consumers are left to search for millions of apps in one monopolized app 
store, where Google controls which apps are featured, identified or prioritized in user searches. 
 
 
41 Investigation of Competition in Digital Markets, supra n.10 at 100. 
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C.  Google Unlawfully Maintains A Monopoly In The Android In-App Payment  
  Processing Market 
1. Android In-App Payment Processing Constitutes a Relevant Product 
Market 
93. The relevant antitrust market for processing payment for digital content, including virtual 
gaming products, within Android apps is the “Android In-App Payment Processing Market”. The 
Android In-App Payment Processing Market consists of the payment processing solutions that Android 
developers could integrate into their Android apps to process the purchase of in-app digital content.  
94. For applications purchased through the Google Play Store, Google requires use of Google 
Play Billing to process in-app purchases of digital content and for all purchases within Android games42 
Because 90% or more of Android-compatible mobile app downloads through an app store occur in the 
Google Play Store,43 Google has a monopoly in this the Android In-App Payment Processing Market. 
95. By selling digital content within a mobile app rather than directly charging for the app 
itself, app developers can make an app widely accessible to all users, then generate revenue to fund 
development of new apps. For example, by allowing users of gaming apps to play games without up-
front costs, developers permit more players try a game “risk free” and only pay for what they want to 
access. Many games are free to download and play but make additional content available for in-app 
purchases on an à la carte basis or via a subscription-based service.  
96. Google offers separate payment solutions for the purchase of digital content than it does 
for other types of purchases, even within mobile apps. Google Play Billing can be used for the purchase 
of digital content and virtual gaming products. 
97. Google’s anticompetitive conduct ensures that Android app developers cannot integrate 
compatible payment processors into their apps to facilitate the purchase of in-app digital content. Nor 
 
42 Play Console Help, Policy Center, Monetization and Ads, Payments, GOOGLE, 
https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/9858738, (last accessed Oct. 8, 
2020). 
43 Press Release, Antitrust: Commission fines Google €4.34 billion for illegal practices regarding 
Android mobile devices to strengthen dominance of Google’s search engine, supra n.9. 
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can app developers utilize any one of the many electronic payment processing options available to 
process in-app purchases and other transactions. Instead, Google conditions developers’ access to the 
dominant Google Play Store on an agreement to use Google Play Billing44 to process in-app purchases 
of digital content. This directly affects consumers. 
98.  Absent Google’s anticompetitive conduct, app developers would integrate payment 
processors into their apps to facilitate in-app purchases or develop such functionality themselves. App 
developers would be able to offer consumers a choice among multiple payment processors for each 
purchase, comparable to options of using different credit cards, Apple pay, etcetera at brick-and-mortar 
stores or on websites. This would result in lower prices for consumers. 
2. Google’s Monopoly Power In The Android In-App Payment Processing 
 Market 
99. Google has monopoly power in the Android In-App Payment Processing Market, 
including the relevant antitrust sub-market for the processing of payments for the purchase of virtual 
products within mobile apps games (the “Android Games Payment Processing Market”). 
100. The geographic scope of the Android In-App Payment Processing Market is worldwide, 
excluding China. Outside China, in-app payment processing tools, such as Google Play Billing, are 
available on a worldwide basis. By contrast, in-app payment processing tools available in China are not 
available outside of China, including because Google prevents the use of non-Google payment processing 
tools for all apps distributed through the Google Play Store, which dominates distribution of apps outside 
of China. 
101. The geographic scope of the Android In-App Payment Processing Market includes a 
separate sub-market within the United States which operates as described throughout this Complaint. 
102. Google charges a 30% commission for Google Play Billing. This rate reflects Google’s 
market power, which allows it to charge consumers supra-competitive prices for payment processing 
within the Android In-App Payment Processing Market. The cost of alternative electronic payment 
 
44 Payments, supra n.42. 
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processing tools, which are prohibited by Google for apps and in-app purchases through the Google Play 
Store, are as little as one tenth of the 30% cost of Google Play Billing. 
103. For example, the electronic processing payment rate for online payment processing 
company PayPal is 2.9%,45 for Stripe it is 2.9%,46 and for Square it ranges from 2.6%-3.5%,47 all of 
which are substantially less than the supra-competitive rate that Google charges. 
3. Google’s Anticompetitive Conduct in the Android In-App Payment Processing 
Market 
104. Through provisions of Google’s DDA imposed on all app developers seeking access to 
Android users, Google unlawfully ties its Google Play Store, through which it has a monopoly in the 
Android App Store Market, to its own in-app payment processing tool, Google Play Billing. Section 3.2 
of the DDA requires that Android app developers enter into a separate agreement with Google’s payment 
processor, Google Payment, to receive payment for and from apps and in-app digital content.48 
105. Section 4.1 of the DDA makes compliance with Google’s Developer Program Policies 
mandatory and those Policies require in relevant part that (1) app developers offering products within a 
game downloaded on Google Play or providing access to game content must use Google Play In-app 
Billing as the method of payment; and (2) app developers offering products within another category of 
app downloaded on Google Play must use Google Play In-app Billing as the method of payment, except 
when the payment is solely for physical products or is for digital content that may be consumed outside 
of the app itself (e.g., songs that can be played on other music players).49 
 
45 PayPal Editorial Staff, Credit card processing fees: What business owners need to know, PAYPAL, 
(May 15, 2020), https://www.paypal.com/us/brc/article/understanding-merchant-credit-card-
processing-fees. 
46 Pricing, Pricing built for businesses of all sizes. Always know what you’ll pay., STRIPE, 
https://stripe.com/pricing. (last accessed Oct. 4, 2020). 
47 How much does Square cost?, SQUARE, INC., https://squareup.com/us/en/pricing?solution=pricing-in-
person-payments. (last accessed Oct. 4, 2020). 
48 See Google Play Developer Distribution Agreement, supra n.28. 
49 Id.  
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106. Google’s unlawful restraints in the DDA prevent app developers from integrating 
alternative, and multiple, payment processing solutions into their mobile apps, depriving consumers the 
availability of competing payment processors with lower fees. 
107. Google has no legitimate justification for this conduct. If, for example Google was 
concerned about the security of its users’ payment information, then it would not permit alternative 
payment processing for certain transactions made on Android phones for physical products or digital 
content consumed outside an app.50 But Google does allow alternative payment processing tools in that 
context, with no compromise to security.51 
4. Anticompetitive Effects in the Android In-App Payment Processing 
108. Google’s conduct harms competition in the Android In-App Payment Processing Market 
(including the Android Games Payment Processing Market) and injures consumers, app developers, and 
competing in-app payment processors. 
109. Google’s conduct harms would-be competitor in-app payment processors who would 
otherwise be free to offer consumers alternative payment processing tools with lower prices and  
improved functionality.  
110. Google also harms consumers by requiring that in-app purchases are transacted through 
Google Play Billing, preventing app developers from providing customer service to consumers without 
Google’s involvement. Google has minimal incentive to compete through improved customer service 
because it faces no competition. In obtaining information concerning app developers’ transactions with 
their customers, Google has an anticompetitive edge in its advertising, whether or not app developers and 
consumers want to share their information with Google. In these ways as well as others, Google directly 
harms app developers’ relationships with consumer who use their apps and make in-app purchases. 
111. Google raises consumer prices through its supra-competitive 30% tax on app and in-app 
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prices reduce app developers’ incentives to invest in and create additional apps and in-app content for 
consumers. 
VI. ANTITRUST INJURY 
112. Plaintiffs and Class members have suffered antitrust injury as a direct result of Google’s 
unlawful conduct. 
113. By unlawfully restricting competition in the Android App Store Market, Google’s 
unlawful conduct has enabled it to charge supra-competitive prices to consumers. 
114. By unlawfully impairing competition in the Android In-App Payment Processing Market, 
Google’s unlawful conduct has enabled it to charge supra-competitive prices to consumers. 
115. Plaintiffs and Class members are the direct purchasers of Android apps and in-app 
purchases. When Plaintiffs and Class members purchase Android apps, they do so directly on Google 
Play and pay Google directly, using their credit card or other payment sources. When Plaintiffs and Class 
members purchase in-app digital content, they do through Google Play, using the payment source set up 
when purchasing that app or other apps on Google Play. When Plaintiffs and Class members purchase 
the in-app digital content, they pay/paid Google directly. 
VII. CLASS ALLEGATIONS 
116. Plaintiffs bring this action on  behalf of themselves and as a class action pursuant to 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a), (b)(2) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on 
behalf of the following class (the “Class”): 
All persons in the United States who purchased an app or in-app 
product or service on the Google Play Store. 
117. Excluded from the Class are Defendants; Defendants’ current or former officers, directors, 
employees, agents and/or representatives; Defendants’ affiliates and subsidiaries; any entity in which any 
Defendant has a controlling interest; any judicial officer presiding over this action and the members of 
his/her immediate family and judicial staff, any juror assigned to this action; and all governmental 
entities. 
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118. The Class is readily ascertainable and the records for the Class should exist, including, 
specifically, within Defendants’ own records and transaction data. 
119.  Due to the nature of the trade and commerce involved, there are least one million  
geographically-dispersed members in the Class, the exact number and their identities being known to 
Defendants, such that individual joinder in this case is impracticable. 
120. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the members of the proposed Class. Plaintiffs 
and members of the Class sustained damages arising out of Defendants’ common course of conduct in 
violation of the laws alleged herein. The damages and injuries of each member of the Class were directly 
caused by Defendants’ wrongful conduct.  
121. Plaintiffs and their counsel will fairly and adequately protect and represent the interests 
of the Class. Counsel for Plaintiffs are experienced in complex class action litigation, including antitrust 
litigation, and will vigorously assert the claims of Class members. Plaintiffs will represent and protect 
the interests of the proposed Class both fairly and adequately. Plaintiffs have no interests that are 
antagonistic to those of the proposed Class, and their interests do not conflict with the interests of the 
proposed Class members they seek to represent. 
122. Numerous questions of law and fact are common to the claims of Plaintiffs and members 
of the proposed Class, and those questions predominate over any questions affecting only individual 
members of the Class. These common questions of law and fact include, but are not limited to: 
• Whether there is a relevant Android App Store Market;  
• Whether there is a relevant worldwide geographic market, excluding China;  
• Whether Google unlawfully obtained and/or maintained monopoly power in the 
market for Android App Stores; 
• Whether competition in the Android App Store Market has been restrained and 
harmed by Google’s monopolization and anticompetitive restrictions; 
• Whether there is a relevant Android In-App Payment Processing Market; 
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• Whether Google unlawfully obtained and/or maintained monopoly power in the 
Android In-App Payment Processing Market; 
• Whether competition in the Android In-App Payment Processing Market has been 
restrained and harmed by Google’s monopolization and anticompetitive 
restrictions; 
• Whether Google’s contractual restrictions for Google Play further Google’s 
attempt to monopolize the Android App Store Market; 
• Whether Google’s restrictions on sideloading apps is an attempt to, and does 
further maintain Google’s monopoly over the Android App Store Market; 
• Whether Google’s conduct results in supra-competitive prices for Android apps, 
in-app purchases, and/or subscriptions to apps obtained in the Google Play Store;  
• Whether Plaintiffs and Class members have been harmed by Google’s unlawful 
practices; 
• Whether Plaintiffs and Class members are entitled to injunctive relief; and  
• The appropriate Class-wide measures of damages  
123. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication 
of this controversy. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would impose 
heavy burdens on the courts and Defendants and would create a risk of inconsistent or varying 
adjudications of the questions of law and fact common to the Class. A class action, on the other hand, 
would achieve substantial economies of time, effort, and expense and would assure uniformity of decision 
as to persons similarly situated without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable 
results. Absent a class action, it would not be feasible for the vast majority of the Class members to seek 
redress for the violations of law alleged herein. 
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VIII. CAUSES OF ACTION 
COUNT 1 
SHERMAN ACT § 2 
UNLAWFUL MONOPOLY AND/OR MAINTENANCE OF MONOPOLY 
For Damages and Injunctive Relief 
(Against All Defendants) 
124. Plaintiffs restate, re-allege, and incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding 
allegation in the Complaint as if fully set forth herein.  
125. Google’s   conduct violates § 2 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits the 
“monopoliz[ation of] any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign 
nations.” 15 U.S.C. § 2. 
126. The Android App Store Market and the Android In-App Payment Processing Market 
(including the Android Games Payment Processing Market) are valid and relevant antitrust markets. 
127. Google holds monopoly power in each of the foregoing markets. 
128. Google has unlawfully maintained monopoly power in foregoing markets through the 
anticompetitive acts described herein, including, but not limited to: (1) impermissibly and unjustifiably 
interfering with consumers’ ability to purchase apps and in-app purchases outside the Google Play Store; 
(2) impermissibly and unjustifiably interfering with consumers’ ability to use payment processing tools, 
other than Google Play Billing, for in-app purchases; (3) conditioning licensing of the Google Play Store, 
as well as other essential Google services and the Android trademark, on OEMs’ agreement, giving the 
Google Play Store preferential placement and treatment; (4) imposing technical restrictions and obstacles 
on both OEMs and app developers that prevent the distribution of Android apps to consumers through 
means other than the Google Play Store; and (3) conditioning app developers’ ability to effectively 
advertise their apps to Android users on being listed in the Google Play Store. 
129. Google’s conduct affects a substantial volume of interstate as well as foreign commerce. 
130. Google’s conduct has substantial anticompetitive effects, including increased prices to 
consumers, reduced innovation and quality of service, and lowered output. 
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131. Plaintiffs were injured and damaged by Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct in a manner 
that the antitrust laws were intended to prevent. For example, Plaintiffs paid supra-competitive prices for 
apps and/or in-app purchases. Additionally, Plaintiffs were deprived of the ability to choose between the 
Google Play Store and lower cost alternatives, that would have been available had Google not engaged 
in the misconduct challenged herein. Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer damages and 
irreparable injury, and such damages and injury will not abate until an injunction is entered ending 
Google’s anticompetitive conduct. 
COUNT 2 
SHERMAN ACT § 1 
UNLAWFUL RESTRAINTS OF TRADE 
For Damages and Injunctive Relief 
(Against All Defendants) 
132. Plaintiffs restate, re-allege, and incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding 
allegation in the Complaint as if fully set forth herein.  
133. Defendants’ conduct violates §1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits “[e]very contract, 
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations.” 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
134. Google entered into agreements with third parties that unreasonably restrict competition 
in the Android App Store Market and the Android In-App Payment Processing Market (including the 
Android Games Payment Processing Market). 
135. These include (i) MADA with OEMs that condition their access to the Google Play Store 
and other “must have” Google services on the OEM offering the Google Play Store as the primary (and 
often the only) viable app store on Android mobile devices; and (ii) agreements with app developers that 
restrict the use of  payment processing systems other than Google Play Billing. 
136. These agreements serve no legitimate or pro-competitive purpose that justify their 
anticompetitive effects, and they unreasonably restrain competition in the foregoing markets. 
137. Google’s conduct affects a substantial volume of interstate as well as foreign commerce. 
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138. Google’s conduct has substantial anticompetitive effects, including increased prices to 
consumers, reduced innovation and quality of service, and lowered output. 
139. Plaintiffs were harmed and injured by Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct in a manner 
that the antitrust laws were intended to prevent. For example, Plaintiffs paid supra-competitive prices for 
apps and/or in-app purchases. Additionally, Plaintiffs were deprived of the ability to choose between the 
Google Play Store and lower cost alternatives that would have been available had Google not engaged in 
the misconduct challenged herein. Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer damages and irreparable 
injury, and such damages and injury will not abate until an injunction is entered ending Google’s 
anticompetitive conduct. 
COUNT 3 
CALIFORNIA CARTWRIGHT ACT 
For Damages and Injunctive Relief 
(Against all Defendants) 
140. Plaintiffs restate, re-allege, and incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding 
allegation in the Complaint as if fully set forth herein.  
141.  Google’s acts and practices detailed above violate the Cartwright Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. 
Code § 16700 et seq., which prohibits, inter alia, the combination of resources by two or more persons 
to restrain trade or commerce or to prevent market competition. See id. §§ 16720, 16726. 
142. Under the Cartwright Act, a “combination” is formed when the anticompetitive conduct 
of a single firm coerces other market participants to involuntarily adhere to the anticompetitive scheme. 
143. The Android App Store Market and the Android In-App Payment Processing Market 
(including the Android Games Payment Processing Market) are relevant antitrust markets. 
144. Google has monopoly power in the foregoing markets. 
145. Google has executed agreements with OEMs that unreasonably restrict competition in the 
foregoing markets. Google entered into MADAs with OEMs that require OEMs to offer the Google Play 
Store as the primary—and practically the only—app store on Android mobile devices. These agreements 
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further prevent OEMs from offering alternative app stores on Android mobile devices in any prominent 
visual positioning. 
146. Additionally, Google conditions distribution through the Google Play Store on entering 
into the standardized DDA described above, including the Developer Program Policies integrated therein. 
Through provisions in these agreements, Google forces app developers to submit to conditions that 
unreasonably restrain competition in the Android App Store Market. 
147. Section 4.5 of the DDA provides that developers “may not use Google Play to distribute 
or make available any Product that has a purpose that facilitates the distribution of software applications 
and games for use on Android devices outside of Google Play.” Section 4.1 of the DDA requires that all 
developers “adhere” to Google’s Developer Program Policies. Under the guise of its so-called “Malicious 
Behavior” Policy, Google prohibits developers from distributing apps that “download executable code 
[i.e., code that would execute an app] from a source other than Google Play.” The DDA further reserves 
to Google the right to remove and disable any Android app that it determines violates either the DDA or 
its Developer Program Policies and to terminate the DDA on these bases. (§§ 8.3, 10.3.) These provisions 
prevent app developers from offering competing app stores through the Google Play Store, even though 
there is no legitimate technological or other impediment to distributing a competing app store through 
the Google Play Store. 
148. Section 3.2 of the DDA requires that Android app developers enter into a separate 
agreement with Google’s payment processor, Defendant Google Payment, to receive payment for apps 
and content distributed through the Google Play Store. This includes payments related to in-app 
purchases. Further, Google’s Developer Program Policies, compliance with which Section 4.1 of the 
DDA makes obligatory, require that apps distributed through the Google Play Store “must use Google 
Play In-app Billing [offered by Google Payment] as the method of payment” for in-app purchases. While 
Google’s Policies exclude certain types of transactions from this requirement, such as the purchase of 
“solely physical products” or of “digital content that may be consumed outside of the app itself,” Google 
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expressly and discriminatorily applies its anticompetitive mandate to every “game downloaded on 
Google Play” and to all purchased “game content.” 
149. Google’s conduct has no legitimate or pro-competitive purpose or effect, and 
unreasonably restrains competition in the Android App Store Market and the Android In-App Payment 
Processing Market (including in the Android Games Payment Processing Market). 
150. Google’s conduct and practices have substantial anticompetitive effects, including 
increased prices to consumers, reduced innovation, poorer customer service and lowered output. 
151. It is appropriate to bring this action under the Cartwright Act because many of the illegal 
agreements were made in California and purport to be governed by California law, many affected 
consumers reside in California, Google has its principal place of business in California and overt acts in 
furtherance of Google’s anticompetitive scheme took place in California. 
152. Plaintiffs were harmed by Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct in a manner that the 
antitrust laws were intended to prevent. For example, Plaintiffs paid supra-competitive prices for apps 
and/or in-app purchases. Additionally, Plaintiffs were deprived of the ability to choose between the 
Google Play Store and lower cost alternatives that would have been available had Google not engaged in 
the misconduct challenged herein. Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer damages and irreparable 
injury, and such damages and injury will not abate until an injunction is entered ending Google’s 
anticompetitive conduct. 
COUNT 4 
ARIZONA UNIFORM STATE ANTITRUST ACT 
For Damages and Injunctive Relief 
(Against all Defendants) 
153. Plaintiffs restate, re-allege, and incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding 
allegation in the Complaint as if fully set forth herein.  
154. Google’s acts and practices detailed above violate the Arizona Uniform State Antitrust 
Act, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-1401, et seq., which prohibits, inter alia, combinations in restraint of, or to 
monopolize, trade or commerce, id. § 44-1402, and monopolization or attempted monopolization of trade 
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or commerce for the purpose of excluding competition or controlling, fixing or maintaining prices, id. § 
44-1403. 
155. Google’s conduct and practices have substantial anticompetitive effects in Arizona, 
including increased prices to consumers, reduced innovation, poorer customer service, and lowered 
output. 
156. Plaintiffs were harmed by Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct in a manner that the 
antitrust laws were intended to prevent. For example, Plaintiffs paid supra-competitive prices for apps 
and/or in-app purchases. Additionally, Plaintiffs were deprived of the ability to choose between the 
Google Play Store and lower cost market alternatives that would have been available had Google not 
engaged in the misconduct challenged herein. Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer damages 
and irreparable injury, and such damages and injury will not abate until an injunction is entered ending 
Google’s anticompetitive conduct. 
COUNT 5 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ANTITRUST ACT 
For Damages and Injunctive Relief 
(Against all Defendants) 
157. Plaintiffs restate, re-allege, and incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding 
allegation in the Complaint as if fully set forth herein.  
158. Google’s acts and practices detailed above violate the District of Columbia Antitrust Act, 
D.C. Code § 28-4501, et seq., which prohibits, inter alia, combinations in restraint of, or to monopolize, 
trade or commerce, id. § 28-4502, and monopolization or attempted monopolization over any part of 
trade or commerce for the purpose of excluding competition or controlling, fixing or maintaining prices, 
id. § 28-4503. 
159. Google’s conduct and practices have substantial anticompetitive effects in the District of 
Columbia, including increased prices to consumers, reduced innovation, poorer customer service, and 
lowered output. 
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160. Plaintiffs were harmed by Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct in a manner that the 
antitrust laws were intended to prevent. For example, Plaintiffs paid supra-competitive prices for apps 
and/or in-app purchases. Additionally, Plaintiffs were deprived of the ability to choose between the 
Google Play Store and lower cost market alternatives that would have been available had Google not 
engaged in the misconduct challenged herein. Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer damages 
and irreparable injury, and such damages and injury will not abate until an injunction is entered ending 
Google’s anticompetitive conduct. 
COUNT 6 
HAWAII ANTITRUST LAWS 
For Damages and Injunctive Relief 
(Against all Defendants) 
161. Plaintiffs restate, re-allege, and incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding 
allegation in the Complaint as if fully set forth herein.  
162. Google’s acts and practices detailed above violate Hawaii’s antitrust laws, Haw. Rev. Stat. 
§ 480-1, et seq., which prohibit, inter alia, combinations in restraint of trade or commerce, id. § 480-4, 
and monopolization or attempted monopolization of any part of trade or commerce, id. § 480-9. 
163. Google’s conduct and practices have substantial anticompetitive effects in Hawaii, 
including increased prices to consumers, reduced innovation, poorer customer service, and lowered 
output. 
164. Plaintiffs were harmed by Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct in a manner that the 
antitrust laws were intended to prevent. For example, Plaintiffs paid supra-competitive prices for apps 
and/or in-app purchases. Additionally, Plaintiffs were deprived of the ability to choose between the 
Google Play Store and lower cost market alternatives that would have been available had Google not 
engaged in the misconduct challenged herein. Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer damages 
and irreparable injury, and such damages and injury will not abate until an injunction is entered ending 
Google’s anticompetitive conduct. 
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COUNT 7 
ILLINOIS ANTITRUST ACT 
For Damages and Injunctive Relief 
(Against all Defendants) 
165. Plaintiffs restate, re-allege, and incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding 
allegation in this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 
166.  Google’s acts and practices detailed above violate the Illinois Antitrust Act, 740 Ill. 
Comp. Stat. 10/1, et seq., which prohibits, inter alia, combinations to restrain or monopolize trade or 
commerce, and the monopolization or attempted monopolization of a market for the purpose of excluding 
competition or of controlling, fixing, or maintaining prices, id. § 10/3. 
167. Google’s conduct and practices have substantial anticompetitive effects in Illinois, 
including increased prices to consumers, reduced innovation, poorer customer service, and lowered 
output. 
168. Plaintiffs have been harmed by Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct in a manner that the 
Illinois Antitrust Act was intended to prevent. For example, Plaintiffs paid supra-competitive prices for 
apps and/or in-app purchases. Additionally, Plaintiffs were deprived of the ability to choose between the 
Google Play Store and lower cost market alternatives that would have been available had Google not 
engaged in the misconduct challenged herein. Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer damages 
and irreparable injury, and such damages and injury will not abate until an injunction is entered ending 
Google’s anticompetitive conduct. 
COUNT 8 
IOWA COMPETITION LAW 
For Damages and Injunctive Relief 
(Against all Defendants) 
169. Plaintiffs restate, re-allege, and incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding 
allegation in the Complaint as if fully set forth herein.  
170.  Google’s acts and practices detailed above violate the Iowa Competition Law, Iowa Code 
§ 553.1, et seq., which prohibits, inter alia, combinations to restrain or monopolize trade or commerce, 
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id. § 553.4, and the monopolization or attempted monopolization of a market for the purpose of excluding 
competition or of controlling, fixing, or maintaining prices, id. § 553.5. 
171. Google’s conduct and practices have substantial anticompetitive effects in Iowa, including 
increased prices to consumers, reduced innovation, poorer customer service, and lowered output. 
172. Plaintiffs were harmed by Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct in a manner that the 
antitrust laws were intended to prevent. For example, Plaintiffs paid supra-competitive prices for apps 
and/or in-app purchases. Additionally, Plaintiffs were deprived of the ability to choose between the 
Google Play Store and lower cost market alternatives that would have been available had Google not 
engaged in the misconduct challenged herein. Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer damages 
and irreparable injury, and such damages and injury will not abate until an injunction is entered ending 
Google’s anticompetitive conduct. 
COUNT 9 
KANSAS RESTRAINT OF TRADE ACT 
For Damages and Injunctive Relief 
(Against all Defendants) 
173. Plaintiffs restate, re-allege, and incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding 
allegation in the Complaint as if fully set forth herein.  
174. Google’s acts and practices detailed above violate the Kansas Restraint of Trade Act, Kan. 
Stat. § 50-101, et seq., which prohibits, inter alia, combinations to create or carry out restrictions in trade 
or commerce, increase the price of merchandise, or prevent competition in the sale of merchandise, id. 
175. Google’s conduct and practices have substantial anticompetitive effects in Kansas, 
including increased prices to consumers, reduced innovation, poorer customer service, and lowered 
output. 
176. Plaintiffs were harmed by Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct in a manner that the 
antitrust laws were intended to prevent. For example, Plaintiffs paid supra-competitive prices for apps 
and/or in-app purchases. Additionally, Plaintiffs were deprived of the ability to choose between the 
Google Play Store and lower cost market alternatives that would have been available had Google not 
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engaged in the misconduct challenged herein. Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer damages 
and irreparable injury, and such damages and injury will not abate until an injunction is entered ending 
Google’s anticompetitive conduct. 
COUNT 10 
MAINE MONOPOLY & PROFITEERING LAWS 
For Damages and Injunctive Relief 
(Against all Defendants) 
177. Plaintiffs restate, re-allege, and incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding 
allegation in the Complaint as if fully set forth herein.  
178. Google’s acts and practices detailed above violate Maine’s monopoly and profiteering 
laws, Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 10, § 1101, et seq., which prohibit, inter alia, combinations in restraint of trade 
or commerce, id., and the monopolization or attempted monopolization of any part of trade or commerce, 
id. § 1102.  
179. Google’s conduct and practices have substantial anticompetitive effects in Maine, 
including increased prices to consumers, reduced innovation, poorer customer service, and lowered 
output. 
180. Plaintiffs were harmed by Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct in a manner that the 
antitrust laws were intended to prevent. For example, Plaintiffs paid supra-competitive prices for apps 
and/or in-app purchases. Additionally, Plaintiffs were deprived of the ability to choose between the 
Google Play Store and lower cost market alternatives that would have been available had Google not 
engaged in the misconduct challenged herein. Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer damages 
and irreparable injury, and such damages and injury will not abate until an injunction is entered ending 
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COUNT 11 
MARYLAND ANTITRUST LAWS 
For Damages and Injunctive Relief 
(Against all Defendants) 
181. Plaintiffs restate, re-allege, and incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding 
allegation in the Complaint as if fully set forth herein.  
182. Google’s acts and practices detailed above violate Maryland’s antitrust laws, Md. Code, 
Com. Law § 11-201, et seq., which prohibit, inter alia, combinations that unreasonably restrain trade or 
commerce, id. § 11-204, and the monopolization or attempted monopolization of any part of the trade or 
commerce for the purpose of excluding competition or of controlling, fixing, or maintaining prices in 
trade or commerce, id. 
183. Google’s conduct and practices have substantial anticompetitive effects in Maryland, 
including increased prices to consumers, reduced innovation, poorer customer service, and lowered 
output. 
184. Plaintiffs were harmed by Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct in a manner that the 
antitrust laws were intended to prevent. For example, Plaintiffs paid supra-competitive prices for apps 
and/or in-app purchases. Additionally, Plaintiffs were deprived of the ability to choose between the 
Google Play Store and lower cost market alternatives that would have been available had Google not 
engaged in the misconduct challenged herein. Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer damages 
and irreparable injury, and such damages and injury will not abate until an injunction is entered ending 
Google’s anticompetitive conduct. 
COUNT 12 
MASSACHUSETTS CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS 
For Damages and Injunctive Relief 
(Against all Defendants) 
185. Plaintiffs restate, re-allege, and incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding 
allegation in the Complaint as if fully set forth herein.  
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186. Google’s acts and practices detailed above violate Massachusetts’ consumer protection 
laws, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 1, et seq., which prohibit, inter alia, unfair methods of competition 
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce, id. § 2. 
187. Google’s conduct and practices have substantial anticompetitive effects in Massachusetts, 
including increased prices to consumers, reduced innovation, poorer customer service, and lowered 
output. 
188. Plaintiffs were harmed by Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct in a manner that the 
antitrust laws were intended to prevent. For example, Plaintiffs paid supra-competitive prices for apps 
and/or in-app purchases. Additionally, Plaintiffs were deprived of the ability to choose between the 
Google Play Store and lower cost market alternatives that would have been available had Google not 
engaged in the misconduct challenged herein. Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer damages 
and irreparable injury, and such damages and injury will not abate until an injunction is entered ending 
Google’s anticompetitive conduct. 
COUNT 13 
MICHIGAN ANTITRUST REFORM ACT 
For Damages and Injunctive Relief 
(Against all Defendants) 
189. Plaintiffs restate, re-allege, and incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding 
allegation in the Complaint as if fully set forth herein.  
190. Google’s acts and practices detailed above violate the Michigan Antitrust Reform Act, 
Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.771, et seq., which prohibits, inter alia, combinations in restraint of, or to 
monopolize, trade or commerce, id. § 445.772, and the establishment or attempted establishment of a 
monopoly of trade or commerce for the purpose of excluding or limiting competition or controlling, 
fixing, or maintaining prices, id. § 445.773. 
191. Google’s conduct and practices have substantial anticompetitive effects in Michigan, 
including increased prices to consumers, reduced innovation, poorer customer service, and lowered 
output. 
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192. Plaintiffs were harmed by Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct in a manner that the 
antitrust laws were intended to prevent. For example, Plaintiffs paid supra-competitive prices for apps 
and/or in-app purchases. Additionally, Plaintiffs were deprived of the ability to choose between the 
Google Play Store and lower cost market alternatives that would have been available had Google not 
engaged in the misconduct challenged herein. Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer damages 
and irreparable injury, and such damages and injury will not abate until an injunction is entered ending 
Google’s anticompetitive conduct. 
COUNT 14 
MINNESOTA ANTITRUST LAW OF 1971 
For Damages and Injunctive Relief 
(Against all Defendants) 
193. Plaintiffs restate, re-allege, and incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding 
allegation in the Complaint as if fully set forth herein.  
194. Google’s acts and practices detailed above violate the Minnesota Antitrust Law of 1971, 
Minn. Stat. § 325D.49, et seq., which prohibits, inter alia, combinations in unreasonable restraint of trade 
or commerce, id. § 325D.51, and the establishment or attempted establishment of a monopoly over any 
part of trade or commerce for the purpose of affecting competition or controlling, fixing, or maintaining 
prices, id. § 325D.52. 
195. Google’s conduct and practices have substantial anticompetitive effects in Minnesota, 
including increased prices to consumers, reduced innovation, poorer customer service, and lowered 
output. 
196. Plaintiffs were harmed by Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct in a manner that the 
antitrust laws were intended to prevent. For example, Plaintiffs paid supra-competitive prices for apps 
and/or in-app purchases. Additionally, Plaintiffs were deprived of the ability to choose between the 
Google Play Store and lower cost market alternatives that would have been available had Google not 
engaged in the misconduct challenged herein. Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer damages 
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and irreparable injury, and such damages and injury will not abate until an injunction is entered ending 
Google’s anticompetitive conduct. 
COUNT 15 
MISSISSIPPI ANTITRUST LAWS 
For Damages and Injunctive Relief 
(Against all Defendants) 
197. Plaintiffs restate, re-allege, and incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding 
allegation in the Complaint as if fully set forth herein.  
198. Google’s acts and practices detailed above violate Mississippi’s antitrust laws, Miss. 
Code. § 75-21-1, et seq., which prohibit, inter alia, combinations inimical to the public welfare that 
restrain trade, increase the price of a commodity, or reduce the production of a commodity, id. 
199. Google’s conduct and practices have substantial anticompetitive effects in Mississippi, 
including increased prices to consumers, reduced innovation, poorer customer service, and lowered 
output. 
200. Plaintiffs were harmed by Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct in a manner that the 
antitrust laws were intended to prevent. For example, Plaintiffs paid supra-competitive prices for apps 
and/or in-app purchases. Additionally, Plaintiffs were deprived of the ability to choose between the 
Google Play Store and lower cost market alternatives that would have been available had Google not 
engaged in the misconduct challenged herein. Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer damages 
and irreparable injury, and such damages and injury will not abate until an injunction is entered ending 
Google’s anticompetitive conduct. 
COUNT 16 
NEBRASKA JUNKIN ACT 
For Damages and Injunctive Relief 
(Against all Defendants) 
201. Plaintiffs restate, re-allege, and incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding 
allegation in the Complaint as if fully set forth herein.  
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202. Google’s acts and practices detailed above violate the Junkin Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 59-
802, et seq., which prohibits, inter alia, the combination of resources by two or more persons to restrain 
trade or commerce, id. § 59-802, and monopolization or attempted monopolization of any part of trade 
or commerce, id. § 16726. 
203. Google’s conduct and practices have substantial anticompetitive effects in Nebraska, 
including increased prices to consumers, reduced innovation, poorer customer service, and lowered 
output. 
204. Plaintiffs were harmed by Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct in a manner that the 
antitrust laws were intended to prevent. For example, Plaintiffs paid supra-competitive prices for apps 
and/or in-app purchases. Additionally, Plaintiffs were deprived of the ability to choose between the 
Google Play Store and lower cost market alternatives that would have been available had Google not 
engaged in the misconduct challenged herein. Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer damages 
and irreparable injury, and such damages and injury will not abate until an injunction is entered ending 
Google’s anticompetitive conduct. 
COUNT 17 
NEVADA UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT 
For Damages and Injunctive Relief 
(Against all Defendants) 
205. Plaintiffs restate, re-allege, and incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding 
allegation in the Complaint as if fully set forth herein.  
206. Google’s acts and practices detailed above violate the Nevada Unfair Trade Practices Act, 
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 598A.010, et seq., which prohibits, inter alia, the monopolization or attempted 
monopolization of any part of trade or commerce, id. § 598A.060. 
207. Google’s conduct and practices have substantial anticompetitive effects in Nevada, 
including increased prices to consumers, reduced innovation, poorer customer service, and lowered 
output. 
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208. Plaintiffs were harmed by Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct in a manner that the 
antitrust laws were intended to prevent. For example, Plaintiffs paid supra-competitive prices for apps 
and/or in-app purchases. Additionally, Plaintiffs were deprived of the ability to choose between the 
Google Play Store and lower cost market alternatives that would have been available had Google not 
engaged in the misconduct challenged herein. Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer damages 
and irreparable injury, and such damages and injury will not abate until an injunction is entered ending 
Google’s anticompetitive conduct. 
COUNT 18 
NEW HAMPSHIRE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 
For Damages and Injunctive Relief 
(Against all Defendants) 
209. Plaintiffs restate, re-allege, and incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding 
allegation in the Complaint as if fully set forth herein.  
210. Google’s acts and practices detailed above violate the New Hampshire Consumer 
Protection Act, N.H. Rev. Stat. § 358-A:1, et seq., which prohibits, inter alia, the pricing of goods or 
services in a manner that tends to create or maintain a monopoly, or otherwise harm competition, id. § 
358-A:2. 
211. Google’s conduct and practices have substantial anticompetitive effects in New 
Hampshire, including increased prices to consumers, reduced innovation, poorer customer service, and 
lowered output. 
212. Plaintiffs were harmed by Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct in a manner that the 
antitrust laws were intended to prevent. For example, Plaintiffs paid supra-competitive prices for apps 
and/or in-app purchases. Additionally, Plaintiffs were deprived of the ability to choose between the 
Google Play Store and lower cost market alternatives that would have been available had Google not 
engaged in the misconduct challenged herein. Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer damages 
and irreparable injury, and such damages and injury will not abate until an injunction is entered ending 
Google’s anticompetitive conduct. 
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COUNT 19 
NEW MEXICO ANTITRUST ACT  
For Damages and Injunctive Relief 
(Against all Defendants) 
213. Plaintiffs restate, re-allege, and incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding 
allegation in the Complaint as if fully set forth herein.  
214. Google’s acts and practices detailed above violate the New Mexico Antitrust Act, N.M. 
Stat. § 57-1-1, et seq., which prohibits, inter alia, the monopolization or attempted monopolization of 
any part of trade or commerce, id. § 57-1-2, and combinations in restraint of trade or commerce, id. § 57-
1-1. 
215. Google’s conduct and practices have substantial anticompetitive effects in New Mexico, 
including increased prices to consumers, reduced innovation, poorer customer service, and lowered 
output. 
216. Plaintiffs were harmed by Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct in a manner that the 
antitrust laws were intended to prevent. For example, Plaintiffs paid supra-competitive prices for apps 
and/or in-app purchases. Additionally, Plaintiffs were deprived of the ability to choose between the 
Google Play Store and lower cost market alternatives that would have been available had Google not 
engaged in the misconduct challenged herein. Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer damages 
and irreparable injury, and such damages and injury will not abate until an injunction is entered ending 
Google’s anticompetitive conduct. 
COUNT 20 
NEW YORK DONNELLY ACT 
For Damages and Injunctive Relief 
(Against all Defendants) 
217. Plaintiffs restate, re-allege, and incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding 
allegation in the Complaint as if fully set forth herein.  
218. Google’s acts and practices detailed above violate New York’s Donnelly Act, N.Y. Gen. 
Bus. Law § 340, et seq., which prohibits, inter alia, monopoly in the conduct of any business, trade or 
commerce or in the furnishing of any service, id. § 340. 
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219. Google’s conduct and practices have substantial anticompetitive effects in New York, 
including increased prices to consumers, reduced innovation, poorer customer service, and lowered 
output. 
220. Plaintiffs were harmed by Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct in a manner that the 
antitrust laws were intended to prevent. For example, Plaintiffs paid supra-competitive prices for apps 
and/or in-app purchases. Additionally, Plaintiffs were deprived of the ability to choose between the 
Google Play Store and lower cost market alternatives that would have been available had Google not 
engaged in the misconduct challenged herein. Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer damages 
and irreparable injury, and such damages and injury will not abate until an injunction is entered ending 
Google’s anticompetitive conduct. 
COUNT 21 
NORTH CAROLINA ANTITRUST LAWS 
For Damages and Injunctive Relief 
(Against all Defendants) 
221. Plaintiffs restate, re-allege, and incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding 
allegation in the Complaint as if fully set forth herein.  
222. Google’s acts and practices detailed above violate North Carolina’s antitrust laws, N.C. 
Gen. Stat.  § 75-1, et seq., which prohibit, inter alia, combinations in restraint of trade or commerce, id. 
§ 75-1, and the monopolization or attempted monopolization of any part of trade or commerce, id. § 75-
2.1. 
223. Google’s conduct and practices have substantial anticompetitive effects in North Carolina, 
including increased prices to consumers, reduced innovation, poorer customer service, and lowered 
output. 
224. Plaintiffs were harmed by Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct in a manner that the 
antitrust laws were intended to prevent. For example, Plaintiffs paid supra-competitive prices for apps 
and/or in-app purchases. Additionally, Plaintiffs were deprived of the ability to choose between the 
Google Play Store and lower cost market alternatives that would have been available had Google not 
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engaged in the misconduct challenged herein. Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer damages 
and irreparable injury, and such damages and injury will not abate until an injunction is entered ending 
Google’s anticompetitive conduct. 
COUNT 22 
NORTH DAKOTA UNIFORM STATE ANTITRUST ACT 
For Damages and Injunctive Relief 
(Against all Defendants) 
225. Plaintiffs restate, re-allege, and incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding 
allegation in the Complaint as if fully set forth herein.  
226. Google’s acts and practices detailed above violate the North Dakota Uniform State 
Antitrust Act, N.D. Cent. Code § 51-08.1-01, et seq., which prohibits, inter alia, combinations in restraint 
of, or to monopolize, trade or commerce, id. § 51-08.1-02, and the establishment, maintenance, or use of 
a monopoly, or an attempt to establish a monopoly, of trade or commerce in a relevant market by any 
person, for the purpose of excluding competition or controlling, fixing, or maintaining prices, id. § 51-
08.1-03. 
227. Google’s conduct and practices have substantial anticompetitive effects in North Dakota, 
including increased prices to consumers, reduced innovation, poorer customer service, and lowered 
output. 
228. Plaintiffs were harmed by Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct in a manner that the 
antitrust laws were intended to prevent. For example, Plaintiffs paid supra-competitive prices for apps 
and/or in-app purchases. Additionally, Plaintiffs were deprived of the ability to choose between the 
Google Play Store and lower cost market alternatives that would have been available had Google not 
engaged in the misconduct challenged herein. Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer damages 
and irreparable injury, and such damages and injury will not abate until an injunction is entered ending 
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COUNT 23 
OREGON ANTITRUST LAW 
For Damages and Injunctive Relief 
(Against all Defendants) 
229. Plaintiffs restate, re-allege, and incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding 
allegation in the Complaint as if fully set forth herein.  
230. Google’s acts and practices detailed above violate the Oregon Antitrust Law, Or. Rev. 
Stat. § 646.705, et seq., which prohibits, inter alia, combinations in restraint of trade or commerce, id. § 
646.725, and monopolization or attempted monopolization of any part of trade or commerce, id. § 
646.730. 
231. Google’s conduct and practices have substantial anticompetitive effects in Oregon, 
including increased prices to consumers, reduced innovation, poorer customer service, and lowered 
output.  
232. Plaintiffs were harmed by Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct in a manner that the 
antitrust laws were intended to prevent. For example, Plaintiffs paid supra-competitive prices for apps 
and/or in-app purchases. Additionally, Plaintiffs were deprived of the ability to choose between the 
Google Play Store and lower cost market alternatives that would have been available had Google not 
engaged in the misconduct challenged herein. Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer damages 
and irreparable injury, and such damages and injury will not abate until an injunction is entered ending 
Google’s anticompetitive conduct. 
COUNT 24 
SOUTH DAKOTA ANTITRUST LAWS 
For Damages and Injunctive Relief 
(Against all Defendants) 
233. Plaintiffs restate, re-allege, and incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding 
allegation in the Complaint as if fully set forth herein.  
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234. Google’s acts and practices detailed above violate South Dakota’s antitrust laws, S.D. 
Codified Laws § 37-1-3.1, et seq., which prohibit, inter alia, combinations in restraint of trade or 
commerce, id., and monopolization or attempted monopolization of trade or commerce, id. § 37-1-3.2. 
235. Google’s conduct and practices have substantial anticompetitive effects in South Dakota, 
including increased prices to consumers, reduced innovation, poorer customer service, and lowered 
output. 
236. Plaintiffs were harmed by Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct in a manner that the 
antitrust laws were intended to prevent. For example, Plaintiffs paid supra-competitive prices for apps 
and/or in-app purchases. Additionally, Plaintiffs were deprived of the ability to choose between the 
Google Play Store and lower cost market alternatives that would have been available had Google not 
engaged in the misconduct challenged herein. Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer damages 
and irreparable injury, and such damages and injury will not abate until an injunction is entered ending 
Google’s anticompetitive conduct. 
COUNT 25 
TENNESSEE TRADE PRACTICES ACT 
For Damages and Injunctive Relief 
(Against all Defendants) 
237. Plaintiffs restate, re-allege, and incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding 
allegation in the Complaint as if fully set forth herein.  
238. Google’s acts and practices detailed above violate the Tennessee Trade Practices Act, 
Tenn. Code § 47-25-101, et seq., which prohibits, inter alia, combinations designed, or which tend, to 
advance, reduce, or control the price or the cost to the producer or the consumer of any such product or 
article, id. 
239. Google’s conduct and practices have substantial anticompetitive effect in Tennessee, 
including increased prices to consumers, reduced innovation, poorer customer service, and lowered 
output. 
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240. Plaintiffs were harmed by Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct in a manner that the 
antitrust laws were intended to prevent. For example, Plaintiffs paid supra-competitive prices for apps 
and/or in-app purchases. Additionally, Plaintiffs were deprived of the ability to choose between the 
Google Play Store and lower cost market alternatives that would have been available had Google not 
engaged in the misconduct challenged herein. Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer damages 
and irreparable injury, and such damages and injury will not abate until an injunction is entered ending 
Google’s anticompetitive conduct. 
COUNT 26 
UTAH ANTITRUST ACT 
For Damages and Injunctive Relief 
(Against all Defendants) 
241. Plaintiffs restate, re-allege, and incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding 
allegation in the Complaint as if fully set forth herein.  
242. Google’s acts and practices detailed above violate the Utah Antitrust Act, Utah Code § 
76-10-3101, et seq., which prohibit, inter alia, combinations in restraint of trade or commerce, id. § 76-
10-3104, and monopolization or attempted monopolization of any part of trade or commerce, id. 
243. Google’s conduct and practices have substantial anticompetitive effect in Utah, including 
increased prices to consumers, reduced innovation, poorer customer service, and lowered output. 
244. Plaintiffs were harmed by Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct in a manner that the 
antitrust laws were intended to prevent. For example, Plaintiffs paid supra-competitive prices for apps 
and/or in-app purchases. Additionally, Plaintiffs were deprived of the ability to choose between the 
Google Play Store and lower cost market alternatives that would have been available had Google not 
engaged in the misconduct challenged herein. Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer damages 
and irreparable injury, and such damages and injury will not abate until an injunction is entered ending 
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COUNT 27 
VERMONT CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS 
For Damages and Injunctive Relief 
(Against all Defendants) 
245. Plaintiffs restate, re-allege, and incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding 
allegation in the Complaint as if fully set forth herein.  
246. Google’s acts and practices detailed above violate Vermont’s consumer protection laws, 
Vt. Stat. tit. 9, § 2451, et seq., which prohibit, inter alia, all unfair methods of competition in commerce, 
id. § 2453. 
247. Google’s conduct and practices have substantial anticompetitive effects in Vermont, 
including increased prices to consumers, reduced innovation, poorer customer service, and lowered 
output. 
248. Plaintiffs were harmed by Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct in a manner that the 
antitrust laws were intended to prevent. For example, Plaintiffs paid supra-competitive prices for apps 
and/or in-app purchases. Additionally, Plaintiffs were deprived of the ability to choose between the 
Google Play Store and lower cost market alternatives that would have been available had Google not 
engaged in the misconduct challenged herein. Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer damages 
and irreparable injury, and such damages and injury will not abate until an injunction is entered ending 
Google’s anticompetitive conduct. 
COUNT 28 
WEST VIRGINIA ANTITRUST ACT 
For Damages and Injunctive Relief 
(Against all Defendants) 
249. Plaintiffs restate, re-allege, and incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding 
allegation in this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 
250. Google’s acts and practices detailed above violate West Virginia Antitrust Act, W. Va. 
Code §§ 47-18-1 – 47-18-23, which prohibits, inter alia, combinations in restraint of trade or commerce, 
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id. § 47-18-3, and the monopolization or attempted monopolization of any part of trade or commerce, id. 
§ 47-18-4. 
251. Google’s conduct and practices have substantial anticompetitive effects in West Virginia, 
including increased prices to consumers, reduced innovation, poorer customer service, and lowered 
output. 
252. Plaintiffs have been harmed by Defendants’ anti-competitive conduct in a manner that the 
West Virginia Antitrust Act was intended to prevent. For example, Plaintiffs paid supra-competitive 
prices for apps and/or in-app purchases. Additionally, Plaintiffs were deprived of the ability to choose 
between the Google Play Store and lower cost market alternatives that would have been available had 
Google not engaged in the misconduct challenged herein. Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer 
damages and irreparable injury, and such damages and injury will not abate until an injunction is entered 
ending Google’s anticompetitive conduct. 
COUNT 29 
WISCONSIN TRADE REGULATIONS 
For Damages and Injunctive Relief 
(Against all Defendants) 
253. Plaintiffs restate, re-allege, and incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding 
allegation in the Complaint as if fully set forth herein.  
254. Google’s acts and practices detailed above violate Wisconsin’s trade regulations, Wis.  
Stat. Ann. § 133.01, et seq., which prohibit, inter alia, combinations in restraint of trade or commerce, 
id. § 133.03, and monopolization or attempted monopolization of any part of trade or commerce, id. 
Google’s conduct and practices have substantial effects in Wisconsin, including increased prices to 
consumers, reduced innovation, poorer customer service, and lowered output. 
255. Plaintiffs have been harmed by Defendants’ anti-competitive conduct in a manner that 
Wisconsin’s trade regulations were intended to prevent. For example, Plaintiffs paid supra-competitive 
prices for apps and/or in-app purchases. Additionally, Plaintiffs were deprived of the ability to choose 
between the Google Play Store and lower cost market alternatives that would have been available had 
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Google not engaged in the misconduct challenged herein. Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer 
damages and irreparable injury, and such damages and injury will not abate until an injunction is entered 
ending Google’s anticompetitive conduct. 
IX. PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court enter judgment in favor of Plaintiffs 
and against Defendants and order the following relief: 
A. Certification of the action as a Class Action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23, and appointment of Plaintiffs as Class Representatives and their counsel of record as Class Counsel;  
B. Preliminarily and permanently enjoining Defendants from engaging in the wrongful 
conduct alleged herein; 
C. Declaring Defendants’ conduct unlawful under the statutes and causes of action alleged 
herein; 
D. Awarding Plaintiffs and the Class treble damages for injuries caused by Defendants’ 
violations of the federal antitrust laws, California’s Cartwright Act, the Arizona Uniform State Antitrust 
Act, the District of Columbia Antitrust Act, the Hawaii antitrust laws, the Illinois Antitrust Act, the Iowa 
Competition Law, the Kansas Restraint of Trade Act, Maine’s monopoly and profiteering laws, 
Maryland’s antitrust laws, Massachusetts’ consumer protection laws, the Michigan Antitrust Reform Act, 
the Minnesota Antitrust Law of 1971, the Mississippi antitrust laws, Nebraska’s Junkin Act, the Nevada 
Unfair Trade Practices Act, the New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act, the New Mexico Antitrust 
Act, New York’s Donnelly Act, North Carolina’s antitrust laws, the North Dakota Uniform State 
Antitrust Act, the Oregon Antitrust Law, South Dakota’s antitrust laws, the Tennessee Trade Practices 
Act, the Utah Antitrust Act, Vermont’s consumer protection laws, the West Virginia Antitrust Act, and 
Wisconsin’s trade regulations; and other monetary relief, including prejudgment and post judgment 
interest, to the maximum extent permitted by law; 
E. Awarding Plaintiffs and the Class reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs; and 
F. Granting such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper. 
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X. JURY TRIAL DEMAND 
Pursuant to Rule 38(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs demand a jury trial of 
all issues so triable. 
Dated:  October 9, 2020 Respectfully submitted, 
 
 MILBERG PHILLIPS GROSSMAN LLP 
 
 
 /s/ David Azar 
 David Azar (State Bar No. 218319) 
dazar@milberg.com 
16755 Von Karman Avenue, Suite 200 
Irvine, California 92606 
Telephone: (212) 594-5300 
Facsimile: (212) 868-1229 
 
 Peggy J. Wedgworth (pro hac vice forthcoming) 
pwedgworth@milberg.com 
Robert A. Wallner (pro hac vice forthcoming) 
rwallner@milberg.com 
Elizabeth McKenna (pro hac vice forthcoming) 
emckenna@milberg.com 
Blake Yagman (pro hac vice forthcoming) 
byagman@milberg.com 
Michael Acciavatti (pro hac forthcoming)* 
macciavatti@milberg.com 
*admitted only in Pennsylvania 
MILBERG PHILLIPS GROSSMAN LLP 
One Penn Plaza, Suite 1920 
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